Phänomenologie der digitalen Welt

Sommerschule der Deutschen Gesellschaft für phänomenologische Forschung

Repository | Series | Buch | Kapitel

209333

Moral autonomy

Gerald Dworkin

pp. 29-44

Abstrakt

There is a philosophical view about morality which is shared by moral philosophers as divergent as Kant, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Royce, Hare, Popper, Sartre, and Wolff. It is a view of the moral agent as necessarily autonomous. It is this view that I wish to understand and evaluate in this essay. I speak of a view and not a thesis because the position involves not merely a conception of autonomy but connected views about the nature of moral principles, of moral epistemology, of rationality, and of responsibility.

Publication details

Published in:

Callahan Daniel, Engelhardt Tristram (1981) The roots of ethics: science, religion, and values. Dordrecht, Springer.

Seiten: 29-44

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4613-3303-6_3

Referenz:

Dworkin Gerald (1981) „Moral autonomy“, In: D. Callahan & T. Engelhardt (eds.), The roots of ethics, Dordrecht, Springer, 29–44.