Aron Gurwitsch's general account of conscious life and its field has three specifications. It can be specified for ideal objects, it can be specified for natural objects, and it can be specified for cultural objects. Objects of the latter two sorts are real, i.e., in temporal and, in a broad signification that includes motivation, causal relations with one another. In the sort of consciousness necessary for the natural sciences, which appears best called "naturalistic,' the values and purposes of objects, i.e., their cultural characteristics, are abstracted from and what are best called "naturalistic objects' result and are then subdivisible into physical (astronomical, chemical, geological, etc.) and biological (botanical, zoological, ecological, etc.) objects. In the third sort fall what are often called "functional objects' but are best called "cultural objects'. These objects retain their cultural characteristics and are constituted in the type of concrete life in which strata of valuing and willing are not abstracted from and which is best called "cultural life'. Cultural life takes many forms and provides the subject matters of what are best called "the cultural sciences'.