Phänomenologie der digitalen Welt

Sommerschule der Deutschen Gesellschaft für phänomenologische Forschung

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177694

Why should a physical object take on the role of truth-bearer?

Artur Rojszczak

pp. 115-125

Abstrakt

The topic of this paper I would like to divide into two other questions than that of its title. The first question is the historical one and sounds like this: Why had Tarski chosen physical objects as truth-bearers in his original work from 1933 about truth in formalized languages?1 This historical problem may be still of importance not only from a historical point of view. Tarski's truth-definition is still seen as one of undeniable importance for any contemporary philosophical analysis of truth.

Publication details

Published in:

Woleński Jan, Köhler Eckehart (1999) Alfred Tarski and the Vienna circle: Austro-Polish connections in logical empiricism. Dordrecht, Springer.

Seiten: 115-125

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-0689-6_10

Referenz:

Rojszczak Artur (1999) „Why should a physical object take on the role of truth-bearer?“, In: J. Woleński & E. Köhler (eds.), Alfred Tarski and the Vienna circle, Dordrecht, Springer, 115–125.