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The concept of "essential" general validity in Wittgenstein's tractatus
pp. 283-300
Abstrakt
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein describes the general validity of logical truths as being "essential," as opposed to merely "accidental" general truths. He does not say much more, and little has been said about it by commentators. How to make sense of the essential general validity by which Wittgenstein characterizes logic? This chapter aims to clarify this crucial concept.
Publication details
Published in:
Costreie Sorin (2016) Early analytic philosophy: new perspectives on the tradition. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 283-300
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-24214-9_11
Referenz:
Halimi Brice (2016) „The concept of "essential" general validity in Wittgenstein's tractatus“, In: S. Costreie (ed.), Early analytic philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer, 283–300.