Recalling once again the primary correspondence of Thomas' entitativum-intentionale distinction with Heidegger's ontisch-ontologisch distinction, the validity of Heidegger's claim to problematic originality stands out at once as verified: "Dasein's ontico-ontological priority was seen quite early, though Dasein itself was not grasped in its genuine ontological structure, and did not even become a problem in which this structure was sought."¹ Thomistic thought recognized full well that "intelligere et esse non sunt idem apud nos."² But the main thrust of Thomistic analysis has always been directed to esse (existentia ut exercita), and to intelligere only insofar as it verified esse ("Critica"). Is there any need to point out that history, and with it, historical, cultural, social, and psychological determinisms are little more than strangers in the Thomistic house? Human solidarity, personality in culture, subconscious determinisms, creative intuition in art and poetry, the metaphysical character of motivation and meaning — all these are fundamental data of the human condition which find their primary basis in the mode of being human precisely not from the side of the esse of existentia ut exercita but from the side of the esse of ens intentionale, from the side, that is to say, of a Daseinsanalyse.